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RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL
INFLUENCES ON JURY DECISIONMAKING IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
MUSTAFA EL-FARRA*

Introduction
In 1984, a woman named Gayle Lewis Daniels was the only
African American on a jury in Columbus, Georgia, that was
deciding whether to impose the death penalty on an AfricanAmerican man named William Henry Hance.' Some may argue
that having an African American on the jury would be beneficial to
Mr. Hance and decrease the chance that he would be placed on
death row. When there are jurors who have the same racial or
ethnic background as the defendant, it seems logical that they could
help prevent racial discrimination in judging or sentencing the
defendant. However, this is not necessarily the case, as illustrated
by Ms. Daniels' experience.
Ms. Daniels said that she never voted to impose the death
penalty on Mr. Hance during jury deliberations. 2 "According to Ms.
Daniels, she voted for death when she was polled by the judge only
because her fellow jurors had intimidated her into doing so." 3 The
other jurors had tried to pressure Ms. Daniels into voting for death
during deliberations, but she refused to do so. 4 As a result,
although Ms. Daniels did not want to sentence Mr. Hance to death,
Law Clerk for the Honorable Robert Hess and the Honorable John Wiley at the
Los Angeles Superior Court. I would like to acknowledge Professor Prince, and
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and White: An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U.

PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 174 (2001).
3. Id.
4. Id.
[219]

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

she ended up doing so because of pressure and intimidation from
the other jurors. What is even more troubling is that a white juror in
that case "confirmed Ms. Daniels's account and added that another
Hance juror described the defendant as 'just one more sorry nigger
5
that no one would miss."'
The question is whether Ms. Daniels' experience on the Georgia
capital jury is an anomaly or is a regular occurrence in our criminal
jury system.
In fact, "the problem of arbitrariness and
discrimination in the administration of the death penalty is a matter
of continuing concern." 6 After discussing the jury selection process,
I will examine studies and statistics regarding the impact of race on
jury decision-making in capital cases. These studies and statistics
show that the race of the jurors, the race of the defendant, and the
race of the victim affect a jury's decision to impose the death
penalty. I will then explore various possible ways of addressing this
problem, including the approaches taken by the courts and
proposals considered by Congress.

I.

Jury Selection Process

The United States has an unfortunate history of systematic
discrimination against African Americans, and that discrimination
infected the U.S. criminal justice system. Under slavery, African
Americans, but not whites, could be punished by death for certain
crimes against white victims. 7
African Americans also were
prohibited from testifying in their own defense or becoming jurors.8
Even after the Civil War, "blacks have been executed for lesser
crimes, at younger ages,... and over this period they have been
disproportionately executed for crimes against whites." 9 However,
almost all of the juries that sentenced African Americans to death
during this period were comprised of white males only.10
The United States Supreme Court finally acknowledged this
problem in 1879. In Strauderv. West Virginia, an African-American
man was convicted of murder in the state of West Virginia, which
had a statute that excluded African Americans from jury service. 1
5. Id.
6. David Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era:An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1638, 1738 (1997-1998).
7. Bowers et al., supra note 2, at 175.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 175-76.
11. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879).
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The Court struck down the statute as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 The principle
that a "State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account
of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice
violates the Equal Protection Clause" was reaffirmed more recently
by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. 13 The Court in Batson
also held that the state's privilege to strike individual jurors through
the use of peremptory challenges is subject to the Equal Protection
Clause. 14 A prosecutor can ordinarily use a peremptory challenge to
excuse a juror for any reason related to his or her view concerning
the outcome of the case, but "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their
race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable
to impartially consider the State's case against a black defendant." 15
Congress has also participated in addressing this problem by
passing the Jury Selection and Service Act in 1968.16 The policy
behind the Jury Selection and Service Act is that anyone litigating in
federal court has the right to a trial by jury "from a fair cross section
of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes." 17 In addition, every U.S. citizen has the right to be
considered for jury service in federal court.1 8 Thus, the Act declares
that "no citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit
juror in the district courts of the United States... on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 19 The Act
also sets forth a system for random jury selection to implement the
20
policy and purpose behind the Act.
However, the principle that a person may not be excluded from
jury service based on his or her race has been limited in scope by the
Supreme Court. According to the Court, although the Sixth
Amendment guarantees that the jury will be selected from a pool of
names representing a cross-section of the community, 21 it has never
12. Id. at 310.
13. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1985) (discussing the conviction of an

African American after the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four
African Americans on the jury venire, and an all-white jury was selected).
14. Id. at 89.
15. Id.
16. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1861-1867 (2000).

17. Id. § 1861.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1862.
20. Id. § 1863.

21. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 522 (1974) (discussing a male defendant's
conviction of a crime by a petit jury selected from a venire "on which there were no

women and which was selected pursuant to a system resulting from Louisiana
constitutional and statutory requirements that a woman should not be selected for jury

service unless she had previously filed a written declaration of her desire to be subject to

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

held that the Sixth Amendment requires that "petit juries actually
chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various
distinctive groups in the population." 22 In other words, the way
juries are chosen does not guarantee a defendant that the jury will
be comprised of a "fair cross section of the community." More
specifically, "a defendant has no right to a 'petit jury composed in
23
whole or in part of persons of his own race."'
Prosecutors have also "preserved the all-white jury by using
peremptory challenges to eliminate blacks at jury selection." 24
Although this is prohibited, "[tihe jurisprudence since Strauder has
made it virtually impossible to successfully challenge the strikes of
black jurors." 25 Under Batson, "the 'burden is, of course' on the
defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire 'to
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination."' 26 A defendant
can establish a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination
solely by using evidence related to the prosecutor's exercise of
peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. 27
"Once the
defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the
State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging
black jurors." 28 The prosecutor's explanation, however, does not
need to "rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause."

29

In other words, as long as the prosecutor's reason for excluding
jurors is rational and the prosecutor does not mention race, courts
typically uphold the exercise of peremptory challenges under the
Batson test. After Batson, "it is agreed that all but the most egregious
30
race-based strikes of black jurors are unlikely to be reversed."
Thus, if a prosecutor thinks his or her case will be more likely to
succeed with a jury comprised of fewer African Americans and
more whites, he or she can shrewdly exercise peremptory challenges
to exclude African Americans from sitting on the jury.
For example, "[a]s recently as 2002, Dallas County prosecutors
were excluding eligible black prospects from juries at more than
twice the rate they turned down whites." 31 This issue surfaced
jury service").
22. Id. at 538.
23. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
24. Bowers et al., supra note 2, at 176.
25. Id. at 176-77.
26. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
27. Id. at 96.
28. Id. at 97.
29. Id.
30. Bowers et al., supra note 2, at 177.
31. Associated Press, Report: Dallas Prosecutors Bar Black Jurors, MSNBC, Aug. 21,
2005, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9033376/.
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earlier in 2005 "when the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the 1986
murder conviction of a black man accused of killing a white motel
clerk, saying the Dallas County jury... was unfairly stacked with
whites." 32 In its decision, the Court recognized that "'[t]he
prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the
eligible African-American venire members ....Happenstance is
unlikely to produce this disparity.'" 33 Further, the Court noted that
"the appearance of discrimination is confirmed by widely known
evidence of the general policy of the Dallas County District
Attorney's Office to exclude black venire members from juries at the
time Miller-El's jury was selected." 34
Although the Court showed that it was willing to consider
statistics and other evidence showing strong indications of racial
discrimination in jury selection, the evidence in Miller-El was
extremely clear and convincing. The Dallas policy was also in place
for many years before the Court finally recognized a problem. In
fact, "[t]he Supreme Court cited a manual, written in 1969 and used
until at least 1980, that instructed prosecutors on how to exclude
minorities from Texas juries," 35 and Miller-El was not decided until
2005. Even after Miller-El, it is generally quite difficult for a
defendant to successfully challenge a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges.
II. Imposition of the Death Penalty: Studies and Statistics
The jury selection process can have a major impact on jury
verdicts, specifically in the sentencing phase of a capital case,
because it determines the racial makeup of the jury. Various studies
and statistics, discussed below, show that the race of the jurors, in
addition to the race of the defendant and the race of the victim,
affect a jury's decision to impose the death penalty.
Before discussing these studies and statistics, it is important to
become familiar with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence relating to
racial discrimination in capital sentencing. In 1986, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that racial attitudes could influence
jurors' sentencing decisions in capital cases, particularly when the
defendant is African American and the victim is white. 36 The Court
ruled in Turner v. Murray that "a capital defendant accused of an
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).
Id. at 253.
Associated Press, supra note 31.
Id.
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interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of
37
the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias."
One should question whether this would resolve the problem
because many jurors may be racially biased subconsciously. Even
those jurors who know they are racially biased may not admit to
that during voir dire. Thus, the Supreme Court recognized a
problem, but its attempt to remedy the issue seems disingenuous.
The Supreme Court's wanton disregard of racial influences on
juror decision-making became manifest only a year after Turner in
McCleskey v. Kemp. 38 In that case, the defendant was an AfricanAmerican man who was sentenced to death after being convicted of
murdering a white police officer. One of the defendant's claims in
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was that "the Georgia capital
sentencing process is administered in a racially discriminatory
manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution." 39 The defendant proffered a
statistical study to support his claim, referred to as "the Baldus
study." 40
This study professed "to show a disparity in the
imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of the
41
murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant."
After analyzing the study in some detail, the Court admitted
that "the Baldus study indicates that black defendants, such as
McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of
receiving the death penalty." 42 Despite this admission, the Court
rejected the defendant's equal protection claim based on the
principle that "a defendant who alleges an equal protection
violation has the burden of proving 'the existence of purposeful
discrimination.' ' 43 The Court held that "the Baldus study is clearly
insufficient to support an inference that any of the decision makers
in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose." 44 In
rejecting the defendant's Eighth Amendment claim, the Court
declared that "[a]t most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy
that appears to correlate with race.
Apparent disparities in
sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system." 45
Thus, the Court held that "the Baldus study does not demonstrate a
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia
37. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding this proposition in a case in
which an African-American man was sentenced to death for killing a white jeweler).
38. 481 U.S. 279, 283 (1987).
39. Id. at 286.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 287.
43. Id. at 292.
44. Id. at 297.
45. Id. at 312.
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capital sentencing process." 46
In McCleskey, the Supreme Court was confronted with a
statistical study showing strong evidence of racial bias in the
imposition of the death penalty. In addition, the case involved an
African-American defendant and a white victim, a combination that
the Court previously acknowledged was especially dangerous in
Turner. Yet, the Court decided to take no action, affirming the death
sentence in the case and not requiring that any changes be made to
Georgia's capital sentencing process. Instead, it fell back on the
principle requiring a specific defendant to establish "purposeful
discrimination," making it extremely difficult for McCleskey, as well
as other defendants in his situation, to succeed in an equal
protection challenge. "Short of an admission of racial bias by the
prosecutor or jurors, this burden of proof is virtually impossible to
47
meet."
The Court in McCleskey "indicated its unwillingness to use
statistics to establish discriminatory intent in death sentence
decisions." 48 One could argue, as the Court did, that the Baldus
study only showed correlation, not causation, but this study and
many other studies seem to give strong indications that racism
taints our criminal justice system. Unfortunately, the decision in
McCleskey "has largely eliminated the federal courts as a forum for
the consideration of statistically based claims of racial
discrimination in capital sentencing." 49 According to Professor
Baldus and his colleagues, there has been "only one case since
McCleskey in which a federal district court has granted a hearing on
a claim of racial discrimination in the application of the death
penalty, and the court dismissed the claim for failure to meet the
50
McCleskey burden of proof."
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey, one should
be aware of the various studies and statistics that show the impact
of race on jury decision-making in capital cases. One should first
consider the fact that "opinion polls show that the public identifies
blacks as more prone to criminality than other racial groups." 51
"This 'racialization' of criminality appears to promote generalized
mistrust of blacks on the part of whites... Among whites, especially
white males, racial stereotypes and mistrust are linked to
46. Id. at 313.
47. Amnesty International Canada, Extreme Prejudice: Racism and the Death Penalty,

http://www.amnesty.ca/usa/racism.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
48. Maxwell C. Smith, Case Note, Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229 (4th Cir.2003), 16 CAP.
DEF. J. 121, 125-26 (2003).
49. Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 1734.
50. Id.
51. Bowers et al., supra note 2, at 179.
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punitiveness, including support for the death penalty."5 2 It would
be difficult for anyone to ignore these stereotypes when he or she
enters the jury box, no matter what instructions the judge gives.
In addition, African Americans and whites have different
perspectives on the criminal justice system, which has implications
on how they will serve as jurors. 53 "Blacks are more likely to believe
that decisions to bring criminal charges, to convict on such charges,
and to impose capital punishment are tainted with racial bias.
Whites... are more likely to see the criminal justice system as4
excessively lenient and rigged in favor of defendants' rights."5
Furthermore, "in capital cases, blacks may be more sympathetic
than white jurors to mitigating evidence presented by a black
defendant with whom they may be better able to identify and
empathize, and whose background and experiences they may feel
they understand better than do their white counterparts." 55 This is
why many prosecutors would like to use peremptory challenges in
capital cases involving African-American defendants to strike
African-American jurors. More African Americans on the jury will
only decrease the likelihood that the defendant will be sentenced to
death.
These concerns are confirmed by studies and statistics. Mock
jury studies, actual jury studies, and death penalty statistics tend to
show similar patterns of "race-linked guilt and punishment decision
making." 56 For instance, one mock jury study has shown that
"white mock jurors were more likely to impose the death penalty on
a black defendant than on a white defendant."5 7 "[T]his tendency is
fostered by white jurors' failing to give effect to mitigating
circumstances when the defendant is black... jurors mentioned
'stereotype-consistent' reasons for their sentencing verdicts.., and
58
appeared less able or willing to empathize with black defendants."
Another mock jury study that focused on capital sentencing showed
59
that the defendant's race was most influential in mid-range cases.
In these cases where the decision could go either way, AfricanAmerican defendants were more likely to be sentenced to death
than white defendants. 60 "Generally, the studies of mock jury
capital sentencing have shown that white mock jurors have the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 183-84.
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strongest tendency to impose death as punishment in cases where
61
the defendant is black and the victim is white."
Actual data from capital juries shows similar results. For
example, Professor David Baldus and his colleagues conducted an
elaborate empirical study of Philadelphia capital juries. This study
analyzed hundreds of capital cases in Philadelphia over a 10-year
period. 62 According to this study, "death sentences are less likely
when black jurors are more numerous." 63 In particular, their
preliminary findings suggested that "black defendants are treated
less punitively vis-a-vis nonblack defendants as the proportion of
blacks on the juries increases." 64 In addition, "the tendency for
black defendants to be treated more harshly than white ones as the
number of whites on the jury increases holds especially for black
defendant/white victim cases." 65 On the other hand, the study
shows that "the tendency for black defendants to be treated more
harshly is curbed, especially when young black males and middle66
aged black females are better represented on the jury."
Another study known as the Capital Jury Project, which
included data representing capital cases from fourteen states across
the U.S., found that "the presence of five or more white males on the
jury dramatically increased the likelihood of a death sentence in the
[black defendant/white victim] cases." 67 This effect did not appear
in cases involving white defendants and white victims, or black
defendants and black victims. 68 On the other hand, the presence of
African-American male jurors in cases involving a black defendant
and white victim "substantially reduced the likelihood of a death
sentence." 69 The presence of black male jurors reduced the
likelihood of a death sentence to a lesser degree in black
defendant/black victim cases, and not at all in white
70
defendant/white victim cases.
In regards to the decision-making of individual jurors, data
from the Capital Jury Project showed that "black and white jurors'
punishment stands diverged more in [black defendant/white
victim] than in [white defendant/white victim] or [black
As the trial proceeded, this
defendant/black victim] cases.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 184.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 1721 n.159.
Bowers et al., supra note 2, at 188.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 195.
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difference became considerably more pronounced." 71 At the guilt
phase of the trial, white jurors were only three times more likely
than black jurors to vote for death, but "[bly the first vote on
punishment, the differential between white and black jurors on
death reached more than seven to one." 72 In white defendant/white
victim and black defendant/black victim cases, the decision-making
pattern was quite different. 73 In these cases, jurors of the same race
as the defendant and victim were more likely to vote for death than
jurors of other races. 74 Once again, this data shows the significant
role that race plays in jury decision-making in capital cases.
In addition to these studies, statistics show a disparate
treatment in the imposition of the death penalty, especially in cases
where the defendant is African American and the victim is white.
Statistics show that 34.2% of the defendants executed in the U.S.
since the revival of the death penalty in 1976 have been black, while
56.9% have been white. 75 Some would argue that this contradicts
the proposition that black defendants are more likely to be
sentenced to death than white defendants. Though, upon closer
examination, since African Americans only represent 12.3% of the
population and whites represent 75.1% of the population, African
Americans are clearly overrepresented in the death penalty
population.76
A particularly disturbing statistic is that in executions since
1976, the victim was white in 79.3% of the cases, while the victim
was black in only 14.1% of the cases. 77 In fact, the U.S. General
Accounting Office declared that "[i]n 82% of the studies [reviewed],
race of the victim was found to influence the likelihood of being
charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e.,
those who murdered whites were found more likely to be sentenced
to death than those who murdered blacks." 78 Furthermore, in 213
cases involving interracial murders in which the defendant was
executed since 1976, the defendant was African American and the
victim was white. 79 On the other hand, only 14 cases involved a
white defendant and an African-American victim. 8 0 This is such a
substantial discrepancy that it would be illogical for one to deny
71. Id. at 200.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 201.
74. Id.
75. Death Penalty Information Center, Race of Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=5&did=184.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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that race, especially the race of the victim, plays a role in how the
death penalty is imposed.
III. Addressing the Problem of Racial Influences on the Jury
in Capital Sentencing
Despite the limited efforts of Congress and the Supreme Court
to address the problem, the studies and statistics discussed above
clearly show that race continues to play a significant role in jury
decision-making in capital cases. The defects in the jury selection
process contribute to this problem because prosecutors might do
whatever is necessary to increase the likelihood of a death sentence,
including striking black jurors when the defendant is black. As
discussed above, they are often able to exclude jurors based on race
because Batson makes it difficult for a defendant to successfully
challenge a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges under equal
protection jurisprudence.
One federal judge tried to create her own solution to the
problem of racial bias in jury decision-making. U.S. District Judge
Nancy Gertner of the District of Massachusetts had a plan that
would have added steps to the jury selection process. 81 Judge
Gertner wrote a 95-page opinion and noted that it would be
"profoundly troubling" if the African-American defendants, Darryl
Green and Branden Morris, were to face an all-white or mostly
white jury in a trial to decide whether they should live or die. 82
Judge Gertner cited a study indicating that "wealthier towns with
fewer minority residents keep more accurate residency lists than
more diverse cities, including Boston." As a result, Gertner found
"a higher percentage of jury summonses sent to minorities come
back as undeliverable or go unanswered, often because the person
has moved." 83
Therefore, Judge Gertner "ordered the jury administrator to
follow up when a notice is returned as undeliverable by randomly
sending a new jury summons to another resident in the same ZIP
code. If a summons goes unanswered, Gertner said, court officials
should send a second notice. If there's still no response, a new
summons should go to another resident in the same ZIP code, she
81. Shelly Murphy, "U.S. judges battle on makeup of juries: Plan to seat more blacks
criticized," THE BOSTON GLOBE, September 16, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/
local/massachusetts/articles/2005/09/16/race-jury-selection is battleincourts/ ?pag
e=full.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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said." 84 In addition, the Chief Judge of the federal court in Boston
"has asked a panel of judges to consider drafting a new jury plan for
85
the whole court."
One state court in particular has also addressed the problem of
racial discrimination in death sentencing. "McCleskey does not bind
state supreme courts and they are free to entertain claims of racial
discrimination under their state constitutions ... "86 However, "...
the idea is distinctly unappealing to nearly all such courts." 87 Only
the state supreme courts in Connecticut and New Jersey, and the
New York state legislature have showed some possible interest in
the issue. 88 Furthermore, only the Supreme Court of New Jersey has
actually heard a race claim. 89
In State v. Marshall, the Supreme Court of New Jersey "rejected
the McCleskey approach and ruled that, under the Equal Protection
Clause of the New Jersey Constitution, claims of both race-of-victim
and race-of-defendant discrimination are cognizable." 90 The test
established by the court "asks whether the race of either the victim
or the defendant 'played a significant part in capital-sentencing
decisions' in New Jersey." 91 Instead of focusing "on the risk that
race might adversely have influenced the decision of either the
prosecutor or the jury in an individual case," the court in Marshall
"focused on the constitutional legitimacy of the system as a
whole." 92
The court found no evidence of unconstitutional
discrimination in Marshall, but if it did in the future, "it would 'seek
corrective measures' whose impact the court could observe through
judicial oversight." 93 These may include "(1) a limitation on the
class of death-eligible cases or (2) the promulgation of more
objective and detailed standards to guide the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion." 94 If the corrective measures did not rectify
the discrimination, the court would presumably declare the system
unconstitutional. 95 In spite of this decision, the Supreme Court of
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 1736.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1737.
89. Id.
90. Id. (noting that in Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1062 (N.J. 1992), the defendant was
convicted for the murder of his wife and then sentenced to death. The death penalty
statute in New Jersey allowed the defendant to request that the Supreme Court of New
Jersey review a death sentence imposed to determine if it was "disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.")
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1737-38.
95. Id. at 1738.
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New Jersey has "rejected all of the [similar race-based] claims it has
96
heard thus far."
Perhaps the courts are not the best venue for resolving the
problem of racial bias in jury decision-making. Professor Baldus
noted that the decision in McCleskey "suggested that one should
present claims of discrimination for corrective action to
legislatures." 97 In fact, two proposals, known as the Racial Justice
Act and the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, were made in the U.S.
Congress after McCleskey. 98 The proposals did not address capital
sentencing in any particular state or "specifically seek to impose
structural remedies on the states that would limit the exercise of
both prosecutorial and jury discretion to the most highly aggravated
cases in which no race effect was apparent, which Justices Blackmun
and Stevens suggested [in their dissent] in McCleskey." 99 Instead,
the proposals were designed "to give offenders the right to
challenge their individual death sentences as racially motivated, just
as individuals who can claim discrimination under federal
employment and housing laws." 100
In particular, the two proposals enabled an African-American
defendant or a defendant whose victim was white to "establish a
prima facie case by showing a racially discriminatory pattern of
death sentencing, presumably after adjustment for the leading
aggravating circumstances." 101
This would have effectively
overruled McCleskey and allowed a defendant to bring a claim of
discrimination based on certain studies, such as the Baldus study,
instead of having to prove purposeful discrimination by prosecutors
in the defendant's particular case. Under the proposals, "[t ]he State
could rebut [the defendant's] showing by demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that identifiable and pertinent nonracial factors persuasively explain the observable racial disparities
comprising the pattern." 102
If the State failed to rebut the
defendant's showing, "defendants would be entitled to relief from
their death sentences if their cases fell within a category of cases in
which a racial disparity existed to their disadvantage." 1 03 Although
the U.S. House of Representatives adopted one of the proposals, the
Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, the Senate rejected it in a House-

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 1735.
Id.
Id. at 1735-36.
Id. at 1736.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Senate Conference Committee.104 Thus, neither proposal became
law.
Because Congress and the courts have not effectively addressed
the influence of race on jury decision-making in capital cases, one
should think about other ways of tackling the issue. Perhaps the
easiest way to resolve the issue would be to abolish the death
penalty. Many people would be surprised to learn that several
years after the McCleskey decision, Justice Powell, who wrote the
majority opinion, "admitted he hadn't fully understood the
statistical evidence of prejudice in the McClesky case and wished he
had voted differently. He said, 'I have come to think that capital
punishment should be abolished."' 105
If one considers the number of death row exonerations that
have taken place, the death penalty system itself seems quite flawed.
Since 1973, 122 people in 25 states have been released from death
row through evidence of their innocence. 106 Even without attention
to race, the large number of exonerations is disconcerting. Yet, if
one were to look at exonerations by race, 61 of those exonerated
were black, while 47 were white. 107 This could indicate that black
defendants are more likely to be executed based on false or
incomplete evidence than other people.
The Supreme Court effectively placed a moratorium on the
death penalty in 1972 when it held in Furman v. Georgia that "the
imposition of capital punishment under existing statutes was so
arbitrary and wanton as to violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishment."' 108 Some of the
concurring Justices, including Justice Marshall and Justice Douglas,
referred to racial discrimination or bias in the application of the
death penalty, but "it was not common to the opinions of the fiveJustice plurality. " 109 However, Furman was short-lived. States
rewrote their capital statutes to decrease arbitrariness and
discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of these rewritten

104. Id.
105. See Amnesty International Canada, supra note 47.
106. Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ article.php?
did=412&scid=6 (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
107. Id.
108. Bowers et al., supra note 2, at 177. (Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), involved three
cases in which the death penalty was imposed, and the Court looked at the death

penalty statutes in Texas and Georgia, which were typical of those in most states at the
time. In each the determination of whether the penalty should be death or a lighter
punishment was left by the State to the discretion of the judge or of the jury. In the three

cases here, the trial was to a jury).
109. Id.
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statutes in Gregg v. Georgia in 1976.110
Conclusion
This note has addressed how race influences jury decisionmaking in the capital sentencing process. The statistics and studies
are staggering. This is an extremely important issue because the
criminal justice system gives juries a vast amount of decisionmaking power. Proposals to deal with the problem in Congress
have failed, and state courts have generally ignored it. Judge
Gertner's approach of trying to tackle the issue at the level of jury
composition makes sense. Unfortunately, her attempt to resolve the
problem was rejected by an appellate court. The U.S. criminal
justice system needs more judges and other participants like Judge
Gertner who have a desire to address the problem of racial bias.
Rather than rejecting such basic attempts to resolve the problem,
judges and the legal community at large should continue to discuss
what viable options are available to continue to improve the system.

110. Id. (In Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the defendant was convicted of armed robbery
and murder and sentenced to death under the post-Furman statute in Georgia. The
statute bifurcated the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, imposed certain procedures
for the jury, and obligated the Georgia Supreme Court to review each death sentence to
determine whether it was disproportionate to the punishment usually imposed in
similar cases).
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